Introduction
Many local governments in Georgia rely on excessive revenues generated from traffic citations and criminal legal system offenses as sources of funding to finance public services, collectively referred to as “fines and fees.” These localities rely on fines and fees to balance their budgets in place of more stable sources of revenue such as property taxes. Local governments that fund 10% of their operations through fines and fees are considered over reliant on using punitive measures to cover revenue for their budgets.[1] Georgia has a heavy concentration of these localities. Nationwide, in localities that surpass this threshold, policing and court practices can also become motivated by revenue concerns rather than public safety.[2] In 2024, at least 102 localities (91 cities and 11 counties) in Georgia derived at least 10% of their revenue from fines and fees to fund their operations, ranging up to 87% in Jacksonville, Georgia.[3]
In 2022, Georgia ranked fifth nationally among the 50 states with the highest levels of reliance on fines and fees as a share of local government general revenues.[4] These figures, along with more recent data, may still be undercounted due to lags in local reporting. Some localities may take several years to submit fiscal reports to the state, or not report at all, because the state has not regularly enforced standard reporting requirements for fines and fees collected.[5] Further, many of these localities have demonstrated capacity and recordkeeping challenges. For example, as of August 2026, 66 cities have yet to report their local revenue data for 2024. Twenty-six of those 66 cities have passed the 10% threshold for fines and fees in one or more years leading up to 2024, heightening concerns that state lawmakers’ policy decisions continue to be made with limited oversight. Furthermore, 26 cities have yet to provide data as far back as 2021, including three that have had excessive reliance on fines and fees in recent years.
This missing data is among other transparency gaps, including public reporting on uncollected fine and fee debts by locality. These deficits in transparency leave policymakers unable to fully evaluate the merits of adding safeguards to regulate fines and fees. During the 2025-26 session, Georgia lawmakers considered but did not enact legislation that would have capped the use of fines and fees as a percentage of local revenues (House Bill 140).[6] During committee debate on the bill, discussion included the use of lagged data which suggested that close to 40 cities used fines and fees to raise more than 10% of revenues in 2024.[7] This updated analysis finds that there were at least 91 cities and 11 counties that met this threshold and were considered excessively reliant on fines and fees that year.
Lagging or unreported fines and fees revenue data also means that other legislation enacted during the 2026 session was considered without sufficient information to evaluate its potential impact. This includes expanded court surcharges across dozens of local court systems and legislation supporting the use of automated speeding cameras in school zones.[8]
Fines and Fees in Georgia
Within the 102 Georgia localities with an overreliance on fines and fees in 2024, 70 relied on fines and fees to fund 10-20% of their public services. Sixteen used them to cover nearly a third (21-30%) of their public services. Ten relied on them to fund one-third to one-half (31% and 50%) of their public services and six used them as their primary revenue source (51%+). Excessive reliance on fines and fees can drive local leaders to encourage law enforcement agencies to engage in revenue-based policing, prioritizing generating revenues over public safety through aggressive civil asset forfeiture (the seizure of cash or property following traffic stops) and ticketing practices. It also can influence local court systems to maximize the use of court appearances as opportunities to extract fees and surcharges from people without regard to their offenses or circumstances.[9]
In 2024, nearly 90% of Georgia cities and towns which funded more than 10% of their government operations through fines and fees had populations below 10,000. Nearly 40% of all Georgia cities and towns above the 10% threshold in 2024 had populations of 1,000 people or less. At least two-thirds of them have economically vulnerable residents experiencing poverty above the state average of 12.6%.[10] Nearly one third of these localities have Black populations above the state average of 33%.[11] This means that a significant number of localities with aggressive fines and fees practices govern marginalized communities, compounding their risks of economic destabilization. This could mean consequences related to employment, ongoing court involvement and negative health outcomes if they encounter traffic or court debt that they cannot afford to quickly pay.[12]
Apart from fines and fees, Georgia’s local governments primarily rely on property and sales taxes to generate revenues.[13] Local governments are responsible for funding municipal courts and an array of public services, while operating under state laws that constrain them from adopting new sources of revenue such as income taxes.[14] As a result, some local governments have few alternatives to using fines and fees to fund their operations.[15]
Between 2019 and 2024, 188 of 689 localities, or 27%, increased their reliance on fines and fees as a share of total revenues.[16] Those localities raised a total of $292 million from fines and fees in 2024 compared to $117 million in 2019, an overall increase of $175 million over five years. Averaging these cost increases across those localities’ adult populations would mean an average per person cost increase from $73.22 in 2019 to $172.47 by 2024, an increase of $99, which amounts to cost growth of 136%.
Even in localities that did not cross the 10% threshold because fines and fees revenue did not grow faster than total revenue, more aggressive or expansive monetary enforcement may contribute to deeper cycles of poverty for economically insecure households. For Georgians near the economic margins, even a minor traffic ticket can trigger a debilitating cycle of debt-based poverty and justice system involvement.[17]
Among at least 316 cities and counties with fine and fee revenue growth from 2019 to 2024, 173 yielded growth of at least 50% over that period, including 117 localities whose revenue climbed at least 100 percent. For example, Homeland, GA increased its fine and fee revenue by 50% ($73,697 in 2019 to $110,617 by 2024); Helen, GA grew 101% ($160,252 in 2019 to $321,431 by 2024) and Locust Grove went from not reporting fines and fees revenue collections in 2019 to $967,000 by 2024. The highest rate of growth among all localities with revenue in 2019 and 2024 was Sycamore, GA, which spiked its fines and fees revenue from $26,116 in 2019 to $2.1 million by 2024.[18]
The Community Harm Behind Georgia’s Fines and Fees Numbers
The concentration of Georgia localities that relied more heavily on fines and fees following the 2020 economic downturn follows trends found in previous studies. In these studies, local governments increased levels of fine and fee reliance following revenue loss from economic downturns and maintained those levels even after their economies improved.[19] Local governments that increase levels of fine and fee generation risk deeper harm to communities already distressed by an economic downturn. Furthermore, maintaining a higher baseline risks delaying or denying recovery in those communities when the economy rebounds.
Spikes in these revenue collections raise concerns that expanded uses of law enforcement and courts as revenue generating mechanisms also mean fewer resources are being utilized towards public safety.[20] It can encourage law enforcement performance measures to focus on citation issuance rates over quality policing,[21] lead to reduced crime clearance rates[22] and weaken public trust among surveilled residents in ways that include avoiding contact with government institutions that could otherwise help mitigate their financial or medical challenges.[23]
In at least 117 Georgia cities, per person fines and fees costs have grown faster than typical household incomes since 2019.[24] This means that Georgians may have fewer resources to pay tickets and court fines even before accumulating debt.[25] It also means that Georgians are more likely to face deeper cycles of debt such as payment plans under private probation supervision, payday loans or bankruptcy filing – all which can lead to long-term financial hardship and or criminalization.[26]
Policy Recommendations
During the 2025-26 legislative session, members of the General Assembly proposed enacting guardrails to protect Georgians from municipal government fine and fee practices driven by revenue incentives that value profit over public safety.[27] In collaboration with advocates and municipal stakeholders, the latest proposal in 2026 sought to gradually impose caps on the annual percentage of municipal government revenue that can be derived by fines and fees, starting at 30% and lowering the cap by 5% each year until reaching 15% of total revenue.[28] Localities generating fines and fees revenue above the cap would have to forfeit it to the state to then be reallocated to the state’s general fund. This proposal is a major first step in disconnecting police and court systems from incentives that drive excessive traffic and court fines and fees.
Incentivizing fair practices across local governments requires added steps to ensure that there are deterrents or punishments for traffic and other legal violations, without incentives to prioritize raising funding over public safety. Fair revenue alternatives are needed to reduce pressures on local governments to structure their budgets around fine and fee revenues. GBPI recommends three policy proposals to bring Georgia closer to those goals:
Enact fine and fee revenue caps and ensure they apply comprehensively to cover various types of traffic and non-traffic monetary enforcement. Safeguards must have clear definitions and tracking methods to prevent loopholes that can allow for revenue over public safety-based practices to shift to other parts of Georgia’s criminal legal system.
Increase fine and fee revenue transparency in local annual revenue by requiring uniform reporting to allow lawmakers to evaluate collection costs and reliability of fines and fees as a funding tool. Along with requiring mandatory reporting for annual fine and fee revenues collected as part of local fiscal reports to the GA Department of Community Affairs (DCA), localities should consistently report data on fine and fee debts that have been assessed but not yet collected.
Establish state-level funding for municipal courts. This recurring funding could boost fines and fees revenue reporting capacity, reduce instances of lagged revenue reporting and disconnect municipal governments from prioritizing their courts as revenue generators.
Conclusion
Georgia’s criminal legal system is at risk of prioritizing the use of fines and fees as a taxation tool over its core mission of preserving public safety. Georgians residing in places that rely on assessing fines and fees to balance their budgets can face long term harm if their households cannot afford to pay the increasing costs associated with minor violations. To prevent fines and fees from remaining a core part of financing the cost of government in these localities, the state of Georgia must do more to create new or improved revenue streams that fairly raise needed funding without turning local justice systems into debt collection agencies. This includes comprehensive safeguards that cap all of a locality’s fine and fee revenue at 10% of its budget. It also requires stronger state enforcement of timely local revenue reporting and support to build local reporting capacity. Part of that support must include a state funding mechanism for municipal courts to better support their operations and disconnect them from fiscal pressures and incentives to rely on excessive fines and fees whose public costs outweigh the revenue they generate.
[1] Khalfani, R. (2022, December 6). Regressive revenue perpetuates poverty: Why Georgia’s fines and fees need immediate reform. Georgia Budget and Policy Institute. https://gbpi.org/regressive-revenue-perpetuates-poverty-why-georgias-fines-and-fees-need-immediate-reform/#_edn4
[2] Sibilla, N. (2019, August 29). Nearly 600 towns get 10% of their budgets (or more) from court fines and fees. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicksibilla/2019/08/29/nearly-600-towns-get-10-of-their-budgets-or-more-from-court-fines/
[3] GA Department of Community Affairs 2024 local government finance report.
[4] Nastasi, V., Reynolds-Tanner, S., Campbell, J. (2026, June 25). Taxation by citation: A 50-state data and policy report on local government fines and forfeitures. Reason Foundation. https://reason.org/commentary/50-state-data-policy-report-local-government-fines-forfeitures/
[5] GA official code 36-81-8.
[6] GA House Bill 140. https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/69562.
[7] Legislative debate on House Bill 140. GA House Governmental Affairs Committee. January 28, 2026. https://www.legis.ga.gov/schedule/house/AQIARgAAA6nWrITxUepClGGA2bgmimX9GGA2by4HAGeQLC1kSDdIixjC7EHFmfIAAAJaYAAAAJVi9mcGGA2b4qFNnaWZAgEUQssAAQGGA2b0pt8AAAAuAAADqdashPFR6kKX6CaKZf37LgEAZ5AsLWRIN0iLGMLsQcWZ8gAAAlpgAAAA.
[8] The GA General Assembly passed and the Governor signed 31 local court technology bills in 2026. https://www.legis.ga.gov/search?k=”technology%20fee”&s=1033&cs=4&p=2; House Bills 651 and 1161 passed in the GA General Assembly and were signed by Governor Kemp. Both bills became law and went into effect on July 1, 2026.
[9]State Court Report. (2023, February 21). Michigan District Judges Association Amicus Curae Brief. Retrieved August 15, 2026, from https://statecourtreport.org/sites/default/files/fastcase/additionalPdfs/processed/Michigan%20District%20Judges%20Association%20-Amicus%20Curiae%20-02.21.2023.pdf
[10] 2024 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year estimate of statewide poverty rate in Georgia.
[11] Khalfani Consulting Group (KCG) analysis of 2024 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year data.
[12] White, D., Rickard, E., Rosenthal, R. 2026. Cascading consequences of fines and fees on rural communities. Pew Charitable Trusts. https://www.pew.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2026/06/04/cascading-consequences-of-fines-and-fees-on-rural-communities
[13]Natasi, V., Reynolds-Tanner, S., Smarkusky, M., Campbell, J. (2026, May). Taxations by Citation, Section 2.2. Reason Foundation. https://fines-fees-2025.vercel.app/incentives.
[14] OCGA 48-7-140.
[15] Mughan, Sian. (2020). Municipal reliance on fine and fee revenues: How local courts contribute to extractive revenue practices in U.S. cities. Public Financial Publications.
[16] Khalfani Consulting Group (KCG) analysis of 530 cities and 159 counties between 2019 and 2024.
[17] Woods, J. (2024, April 15). Reimagining Traffic Fines and Fees. UC Irvine Law Review 936. Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 24-12. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4795322
[18]https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/gbpi.tableau.account/viz/GBPI2026FinesandFeesDashboard/NDB1A-FnFbyCity.
[19] Nastasi, V., Reynolds-Tanner, S., Smarkusky, M., Campbell, J. (2026, May). Taxation by citation: A 50-state data and policy report on local government fines and forfeitures. Reason Foundation. https://fines-fees-2025.vercel.app/incentives
[20] Nastasi, V., Reynolds-Tanner, S., Smarkusky, M., Campbell, J. (2026, May). Taxation by citation: A 50-state data and policy report on local government fines and forfeitures. Reason Foundation. https://fines-fees-2025.vercel.app/incentives
[21] Garrett, T., Wagner, G. (2007). Red ink in the rearview mirror: Local fiscal conditions and the issuance of traffic tickets. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Working Paper 2006-048. https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2006.048
[22] Goldstein, R., Sances, M., You, H. 2018. Exploitative revenues, law enforcement, and the quality of government service. Urban Affairs Review. https://hyeyoungyou.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/finesandpolicing.pdf
[23] Oneill, K., Kennedy, I., Harris, A. 2022. Debtor’s blocks: How monetary sanctions make between-neighborhood racial and economic inequalities worse. University of Washington. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9122038/pdf/nihms-1797447.pdf
[24] Khalfani Consulting Group (KCG) analysis comparing available fines and fees per person cost growth and median household incomes between 2019 and 2024, across 530 Georgia cities, using data from Census ACS 5-year survey and GA DCA fine and fee revenue. To see those comparisons by city, see our latest fines and fees dashboard: GBPI 2026 Fines and Fees Dashboard | Tableau Public
[25] KCG analysis of growth of per capita fines and fees costs and overall median household income between 2019 and 2024, using 5-year 2024 US Census American Community Survey and GA Department of Community Affairs local finance data.
[26] Oneill, K., Kennedy, I., Harris, A. (2022, January). Debtor’s blocks: how monetary sanctions make between-neighborhood racial and economic inequalities worse. University of Washington.
[27]House Bill 140 was proposed in the Georgia General Assembly during the 2026 legislative session..
[28] Georgia House Bill 140, LC 47 3928S, lines 30-37. https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/69562.